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Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages
Abstract
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a
fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied
to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this
fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under
other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape
and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit
system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become
unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.
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Abstract 
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction 
of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous 
level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into 
account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment 
compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting 
curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of 
unemployment benefits of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium 
unemployment. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature dealing with dynamic wage bargaining on the firm level in a general 
equilibrium framework usually makes the following assumptions1: (i) Unemployment benefits 
are not lump-sum transfers but a function of the wage level. (ii) The functional relationship is 
such that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. (iii) 
Unemployment benefits are the same for persons being already unemployed in the bargaining 
period and persons getting unemployed in later time periods.  
Due to the presumed large number of firms and labor unions, assumption (ii) implies that the 
bargaining parties consider unemployment benefits to be exogenous. As a further 
consequence benefits are identical for all persons getting unemployed in the same period 
independent of their previous workplace. Assumption (iii) implies that unemployment 
benefits do not depend on the time period in which a worker becomes unemployed. This 
would be the case if unemployment benefits of all unemployed are related to the actual 
average wage level. 
 
We find assumption (i) to be plausible for most economies2, but argue that assumptions (ii) 
and (iii) have to be modified. For many real-world economies these assumptions are not a 
valid description of the institutional setup, since unemployment benefits are usually tied to the 
previous level of individually earned wages3. In this case one could expect that labor unions 
will not consider unemployment benefits to be exogenous but will take account of the fact 
that higher wage claims today imply higher unemployment benefits tomorrow. Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Cf. Layard and Nickell (1990), Manning (1993) and Altenburg and Straub (1998). 
2 Exceptions are, for instance, Australia, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Poland and New Zealand, where 
a flat-rate benefit scheme is implemented. 
3 For an international comparison of unemployment compensation systems see, for instance, OECD (1999), 
Schmid and Reissert (1996) and Schönmann et al. (2000)  
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unemployment benefits of those being unemployed in the bargaining period will differ from 
benefits of those who get unemployed in later periods. 
In this paper we show how the analysis and the results are modified if assumptions (ii) and 
(iii) are altered. Our theoretical framework encompasses influential models of the literature as 
special cases. In the comparison of our results with those of the literature, we focus on the 
case usually considered in the literature, namely the case with risk-neutral workers and Cobb-
Douglas technology. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of 
the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. 
In addition, the paper contributes to the recent political debate in many European economies 
stating that unemployment benefits have to be reduced in order to overcome the 
unemployment problem. In the model of this paper a distinction is made between 
unemployment benefits of those being unemployed in the bargaining period and those who 
get unemployed afterwards. It is demonstrated that policies which only reduce benefits of the 
latter group exhibit adverse effects on wage pressure and lead to higher equilibrium 
unemployment. 
 
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and derives the contributions of firms and labor 
unions to the Nash bargain. Section 3 considers the results of the firm-level wage bargain, 
which is followed by a discussion of the properties of the aggregate wage-setting curve in 
Section 4. Section 5 compares our results for the wage-setting curve with those obtained 
under other unemployment compensation systems. Section 6 describes the general 
equilibrium and presents comparative-static results for changes in the replacement ratio. 
Section 7 extends the basic model by allowing for taxes on wage income and unemployment 
benefits. Section 8 discusses the implications of some of the model's assumptions and Section 
9 concludes.  
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2 Contributions of firms and labor unions to the Nash bargain 
We consider a closed economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage 
bargains taking place at the firm level. There are n identical firms and an equal number of 
identical unions. All firms are unionized and bargain with their own union. Since the number 
of firms and unions is large, the bargaining parties neglect the consequences of their decisions 
for the rest of the economy. The values of the objective functions of firms and unions in the 
case of a successful bargain in period t are denoted as tΠ  and tZ , respectively. If an 
agreement cannot be reached the corresponding values are tΠ and tZ . The bargaining 
outcome is obtained by maximizing the asymmetric Nash product 
( ) ( ) γγ −Π−Π−=Ω 1ttttt ZZ , where γ describes the bargaining power of labor unions (0 < γ < 
1). After the determination of wages employers unilaterally choose the level of employment 
which guarantees the highest profits. This right to manage of employers is taken into 
account in the wage bargain4. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, the growth 
process of the economy is not modelled. In other words, technological progress as well as 
investment and saving decisions are neglected. Instead, it is assumed that the stock of capital 
is exogenously given and evenly distributed among firms. The main analysis is facilitated by 
assuming that unemployment benefits are financed by lump-sum taxes on the fixed stock of 
capital5. In Section 7 it is discussed whether and how the analysis is changed if unemployment 
benefits are financed by taxes on labor income. 
Consider first the employer's side of the wage bargain. If profits are earned at the end of each 
period, a firm's discounted profits at the beginning of period t are 
                                                 
4 We do not consider the possibility that firms and unions bargain over both wages and employment. The 
implications of a dynamic efficient bargaining model are discussed in Egger (2002). 
5 The simplifying assumptions with regard to economic growth and taxes are (at least implicitly) also made in 
other dynamic wage bargaining models. See, for instance, Altenburg and Straub (1998), Layard and nickell 
(1990) and Manning (1991). 
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  [ ]1)(1
1
+Π+−−+
=Π t
c
ttttt FNWNRρ
,  (1) 
where ρ is the discount rate of firms, tN  is employment and tW and ctF denote (real) wages 
and fixed costs, respectively. 1+Π t denotes discounted profits at the beginning of period  1+t . 
For the revenue function R  it is assumed that 0>NR and 0<NNR , where NR  and NNR  are 
the first and second derivatives of the revenue function with respect to employment. Now 
assume that in a bargaining period t  wages are negotiated for T  periods, implying 
11 ... −++ === Tttt WWW  and  11 ... −++ === Tttt NNN . In this case the bargained wage tW will 
affect 1,..., −+ΠΠ Ttt , but not Tt+Π  onwards. If fixed costs are constant for all periods, i.e. 
cc
t FF = , the same period profits are obtained in all T periods in which the wage contract is 
binding. This leads to 
 [ ] Ttctttt FNWNR +Π+−−−=Π νρν )(1  with T)1/(1 ρν +≡ . (2) 
If no agreement is reached, firms have to incur losses caused by the fixed costs until a new 
bargaining round takes place. It is assumed that the timing as well as the outcome of the next 
bargaining round are not affected by the fact that no agreement has been reached in period t . 
Discounted profits of the firm in the no-agreement case are then given by6  
 Tt
c
t F +Π+
−
−=Π ν
ρ
ν1 . (3) 
With eqs. (2) and (3) the firm's contribution to the Nash bargain is 
 [ ]ttttt NWNR −−=Π−Π )(1 ρ
ν . (4) 
Turning to the union's side of the wage bargain, it is assumed that the contribution of labor 
unions to the Nash maximand is given by 
                                                 
6 In Manning (1991) similar expressions for tΠ and tΠ are derived. 
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 ( )ttttt VVNZZ ~−=− , (5) 
where  tV  describes the individual welfare associated with a job within the firm and tV
~  is the 
individual welfare associated with being unemployed (both variables referring to period t ). 
Eq. (5) is a standard formulation in the literature, which, for instance, is chosen by Layard and 
Nickell (1990) and Manning (1991, 1993)7. In contrast, Altenburg and Straub (1998)assume 
that unions do not care about employment. The objective function then reduces to VV ~− , 
which is formally identical to the one which results in the seniority trade union model 
discussed by Oswald (1993), if employment in the firm is higher than the minimum 
employment level at which the worker with median seniority is employed. However, it is 
conceivable that, along with his own wage, the median member is also interested in 
employment (cf. Lever and van Veen, 1991). As Pencavel (1985, p. 199) puts it: Altruism 
may well not be a relevant factor in a number of cases, but at the same time in parts of North 
American and West European societies there are deep traditions of working class fellowship 
and in such instances it would be shortsighted to presume that such sentiments have no 
behavioral consequences. Considering the implications of the pure' seniority model as too 
restrictive, we prefer a specification of labor unions' preferences where employment enters the 
utility function8. 
To determine the outcome of the Nash bargain, tt VV
~
−  has to be specified. The model under 
consideration is deterministic in nature, i.e. stochastic shocks are neglected. Therefore, an 
exogenous quit rate is introduced into the model to allow for job turnover in the steady state. 
Let  δ  denote the proportion of employees who leave employment and enter unemployment 
in each period. With the unemployment rate u  being constant in the steady state, the 
                                                 
7 The latter author uses a slightly more general specification by allowing for an employment weight which may 
be different from one. 
8 Alternatively, in Egger (2002) a dynamic bargaining model with Stone-Geary objective function is analyzed. 
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probability of an unemployed person for finding a new job, a , is endogenously determined 
by9  
 
u
ua )1( −= δ . (6) 
An increase in the unemployment rate reduces the probability of getting a new job, i.e. 
0/ <∂∂ ua , whereas a rise in the quit rate enhances the reemployment prospects, i.e. 
0/ >∂∂ δa . It is assumed that wages and employment are both determined at the beginning of 
the period but payments (wages or unemployment benefits) are made at the end of the period. 
Benefits for an unemployed person depend on the respective wage earned in his last 
occupation. In the steady state ( u  constant), at the beginning of any period t the expected 
lifetime utility tV of an individual who remains employed in period t  in the firm under 
consideration is given by the following present value expression: 
 [ ]11 )1()(1
1
++ −+++
= tttt VVWUr
V δδ , (7) 
where r  is the discount rate of workers, which may differ from the discount rate of firms ρ , 
and  U  denotes the utility function of income. 1+tV  is the expected lifetime utility of a person 
(at the beginning of period 1+t ) who gets unemployed at the beginning of period 1+t  and 
has previously worked in the firm under consideration. It is defined as 
 [ ]22111 )1()(1
1
++++ −+++
= tttt VaaVBUr
V , (8) 
where B  denotes (real) unemployment benefits. A subscript 1 is used to distinguish utility 
levels and wages (or benefits) of individuals who work in an occupation elsewhere (or have 
previously worked elsewhere and are now unemployed) from the respective values of 
individuals who work (or have previously worked) in the firm under consideration. Thus, 1V  
                                                 
9 It is assumed that each individual has the same reemployment probability. Hence, we do not take into account 
that individuals may have different unemployment risks due to different qualifications, abilities and so on. 
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is the expected lifetime utility of a person being employed elsewhere and is (for period t ) 
defined by  
 [ ]111111 )1()(1
1
++ −+++
= tttt VVWUr
V δδ , (9) 
with 
 [ ]2121111 )1()(1
1
+++ −+++
= tttt VaaVBUr
V . (10) 
1W  denotes the wage paid in firms different from the one under consideration. 1B  are 
unemployment benefits for persons who previously worked at a firm different from that under 
consideration. 1V  is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed person whose last 
workplace was at a firm elsewhere. In eq. (8) it is implicitly assumed that a person leaving the 
pool of unemployed will never again get a job in the firm under consideration, since the 
probability of this event is virtually zero due to the large number of firms. Furthermore, in this 
model it is assumed that a direct switch from one firm to another is not possible. Workers who 
want to change their employer first have to enter the pool of the unemployed. 
As explained in the introduction we consider an economy where unemployment benefits of 
individuals are related to their own  previous earnings, thereby modifying assumption (ii) 
which states that benefits are a function of the average wage level. Hence, for those getting 
unemployed in period 1+t  their own wage of period t  is relevant for the determination of 
benefit levels. This has to be taken into account in equations (8)  and(10) implying that 
tt bWB =+1  and tt bWB 111 =+ , where b  is the exogenous replacement ratio )10( << b . Since at 
the firm level a distinction is made between wages paid by different firms, this modification 
implies that unemployment benefits may vary between unemployed persons who were 
previously employed in different firms. Making unemployment benefits dependent on 
previous individual earnings also implies that assumption (iii) has to be altered. Since wage 
levels before the bargaining period may differ from wages prevailing afterwards, it follows 
that also unemployment benefits may be different across time periods. 
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To show the consequences of a modification of assumptions (ii) and (iii), we focus on the 
infinite bargain case with  ∞→T  which has been considered by Layard and Nickell (1990) 
and Hoel (1991)10. It is assumed that a symmetric equilibrium prevailed before the bargaining 
period 0tt =  implying that wages and unemployment benefits were the same for all 
individuals. At the beginning of period 0t in each firm unique wage and employment levels 
are chosen for this and all future periods. As a result the (new) steady state will already be 
reached in period 0t . Omitting time indices for steady state values, equations (7) to (10) 
become:  
 [ ]VVWU
r
V )1()(
1
1 δδ −++
+
= , (11) 
 [ ]VaaVbWU
r
V )1()(
1
1
1 −+++
= , (12) 
 [ ]1111 )1()(1
1 VVWU
r
V δδ −++
+
= , (13) 
 [ ]1111 )1()(1
1 VaaVbWU
r
V −++
+
= . (14) 
Additionally one obtains 
 [ ]VaaVBU
r
V t
~)1()(
1
1~
10
−++
+
= , (15) 
where 
0t
B denotes the level of unemployment benefits for those persons, who entered 
unemployment before or in the bargaining period. Since benefits depend on wages paid by the 
previous employer, one must distinguish the expected lifetime utility of a person who gets 
unemployed after the bargaining period and has previously worked in the firm under 
consideration, V , from the expected lifetime utility of a person who gets unemployed before 
                                                 
10 In the finite bargain case additional problems arise since the steady state concept applied by Layard and 
Nickell (1990) and Manning (1991) cannot be used if future wage levels are influenced by todays bargain. 
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or in the bargaining period, V~ . The reason is that wage levels and hence unemployment 
benefits before and after the wage bargain may differ.  
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 gives an idea of how the intertemporal structure of the model is simplified by the 
assumption of an infinite wage bargain. An important aspect is that from period 0tt =  
onwards it does not matter in which period a person gets unemployed. It is only relevant 
whether the last workplace was at the firm under consideration or at a firm elsewhere in the 
economy. In other words: a person who becomes unemployed after the bargaining period 
always gets unemployment benefits bW  if the last workplace was at the firm under 
consideration, and unemployment benefits 1bW  otherwise. 
Our framework is more complex then the infinite bargaining framework usually considered in 
the literature. The reason is that in the literature it is assumed that unemployment benefits of 
all unemployed are always related to the actual average wage level. For the latter case, the 
lifetime utility V  is depicted in Figure 2. Since unemployment benefits of all unemployed are 
equal to 1bW , the present discounted value of the utility stream of an unemployed person is 
always equal to 1V . Moreover, since unemployment benefits are always related to the actual 
wage level, the expression for V~  of eq. (15) equals the expression for 1V . 
[Figure 2] 
 
Turning back to our framework, from equations (11) to (15) and eq. (6) it can be deduced that 
 [ ])()(1~ WUWU
r
VV −
+
=− δ , (16) 
where  
 [ ] ).()()()()()()()(1)( 11 0 bWUubWUuBUuWUuWU t λψτω −++−≡  (17) 
The functions containing the unemployment rate as argument are defined as  
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 ,0
)1(
)()( ≥
+−
+
≡
ruu
uru δ
δ
τ 0
))1)(((
)1()(
2
≥
+−+
−
≡
ruuru
uuu δδ
δψ , 
,0
)1(
)( ≥
+−
≡
ruu
uu δ
δλ  ,0)()()()()( ≥
+
+
=−+≡ δ
δλψτω
ru
uruuuu  (18) 
where the equality sign in all expressions holds for 0=u (and in the case of )(uψ also for 
1=u ). It can also be seen that )()( uu τλ <  for all unemployment rates 0>u . Furthermore, 
1)( ≤uω , where the equality sign holds for 1=u . 
3 Firm-level wage bargain 
With the theoretical framework in place, the result of the wage bargain can be derived. Taking 
account of eqs. (4), (5) and (16), the right-to-manage bargaining result is obtained by 
maximizing the Nash product  
 [ ]{ } { } γγ −−−=Ω 1)()()(
0
WNNRWUWUNt , s.t. 0=−WRN , (19) 
with respect to W  and N . The constraint in eq. (19) reflects the fact that firms choose a point 
on the labor demand curve11. After some transformations the following first order condition is 
obtained: 
 
[ ] µ=
−
−
)()( WUWU
WUU WW , where 
NR
NR
WN
,
,
, 1
1
ε
ε
γ
γ
εµ
−
−
+≡ . (20) 
WU  and WU  denote the derivatives of U and U with respect toW . )/(, NNNWN NRR−≡ε is the 
elasticity of labor demand with respect to wages (in absolute values), and RNRNNR /)(, ≡ε  
denotes the elasticity of revenues with respect to employment. 
                                                 
11 The constant factors ρ/1 and )/(1 δ+r are omitted, since they have no influence on the Nash solution (note 
that in the infinite bargain case 0lim =
∞→
ν
T
).  
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In the literature the analysis is usually restricted to the case with an isoelastic goods demand 
function of the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) type. Defining κ  as ( ) ηηκ /1−≡ ,  where η is 
the constant elasticity of demand ( 1>η ), and describing technology by means of the 
production function ),( KNF ,  where K   is the fixed stock of capital, one obtains  
F
RFR NN
κ
=  and 
F
F
R
F
F
RR NN
N
NN
NNN )1( κ−−= , with 10 << κ . 
NF  and NNF denote the first and second partial derivative of F with respect to N . The higher 
the degree of competition on the goods market (described by a higher elasticity of the demand 
for goods) the higher is the parameter κ . If it is assumed that the production function is 
linear-homogenous the expression µ  defined in eq. (20) can be written as  
 
NY
NY
NYNY ,
,
,
1
, 1
1
)1()1(
1
κε
κε
γ
γ
εεκ
µ
σ −
−
+
−+−
= . (21) 
In this equation NY ,ε  denotes the elasticity of output with respect to employment and σ  the 
elasticity of substitution between employment and capital. In the Cobb-Douglas case 
with αα −= 1),( KNNKF , it follows that αε =NY ,  and 1=σ . Hence, the expression µ , which 
in general depends on W and N , becomes constant if the production function is of the Cobb-
Douglas type. In order to derive a solution which is directly comparable with the respective 
results in the literature, we restrict our analysis to the case with isoelastic goods demand and 
Cobb-Douglas technology. Furthermore, we assume that workers are risk-neutral, which 
implies that WWU =)( and bWbWU =)( .12 In this case )(WU , which is defined in eq. (17), 
can be written as:13  
                                                 
12 The following analysis would also be valid in a somewhat more general model variant with isoelastic utility 
functions of workers ββ /)( WWU = , which has also been considered in the literature. To simplify the 
exposition we restrict the analysis to the case with 1=β .  
13 The imposed restrictions also are sufficient conditions to guarantee a unique bargaining solution in the right-
to-manage model. For a detailed discussion see Alexander and Ledermann (1996). 
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 [ ] bWubWuBuWuWU t )()()()(1)( 11 0 λψτω −++−≡ . (22) 
Due to eq. (20) the following wage is chosen on the firm level: 
 [ ]{ }11 )()()(1)(1 11 0 bWuBuWubuW t ψτωλµµ ++−+−= , (23) 
where µ  is constant in the Cobb-Douglas case. For 0>W the condition 1>µ  must hold.  
 
4 The aggregate wage-setting curve 
As a next step the aggregate wage-setting curve will be derived. Since all bargaining units are 
identical, in the general equilibrium WW =1  must hold. In Appendix A.1 it is shown that the 
following aggregate wage-setting equation results:  
 [ ][ ] 01)()(1
)()( tBubu
uuWW
−+
==
µωλ
µτ . (24) 
For 0>W  it must hold that 01)( >−uµω . Hence, the wage-setting curve is only defined for 
]1,(uu∈ ,  where [ ]ru )1(/ −+= µµδδ  determines the lower bound for the unemployment 
rate. It can be shown that 
0t
BW > for all permissible values of u . A lower µ  implies that on 
the firm level the wage mark-up on the outside alternative income rises. For this reason a 
lower µ  cet. par. leads to a higher wage-setting curve in real wage-unemployment space.14 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 We also scrutinized the implications of a changing δ  or r  for the location and shape of the wage-setting 
curve. However, the resulting expressions turned out to be rather complicated and difficult to interpret. Due to a 
different focus of this paper we omit a discussion of the impact of these parameters on the wage-setting curve. 
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In the current debate about remedies for the unemployment problem it is often claimed that 
unemployment benefits must be reduced to lower wage pressure and hence unemployment.15 
With respect to 
0t
B , which are unemployment benefits of those who are unemployed in the 
bargaining period, such claims seem to be confirmed by eq. (24), since a reduction of 
0t
B  
leads to a lower wage-setting curve. Interestingly, the opposite result is obtained if the 
replacement ratio b  is changed and unemployment benefits 
0t
B  are held constant. Such a 
situation may arise if in the bargaining period the government announces that unemployment 
benefits of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period will be reduced, whereas 
the payments to the currently unemployed remain unchanged. As can be seen from eq. (24), a 
reduction in the replacement ratio b  with given 
0t
B  leads to higher wage pressure. The 
reason for this surprising result is that a reduction of b  lowers the costs of a wage increase 
more than the corresponding gains, thus provoking higher wage claims at a given 
unemployment rate.16 
Next we compute the slope of the wage-setting curve, which due to eq. (24) leads to  
 
02)]([
)(')()()(')(
tBuq
uquuqu
du
udW µτµτ −
= , (25) 
where 0]1)(][)(1[)( >−+≡ ubuuq µωλ . In Appendix A.2 it is demonstrated that  
 
du
dW
<
=
> 0 iff )1( b−µ
<
=
> )(ug , (26) 
                                                 
15 In recent years unemployment benefits have already been reduced in several countries, as, for example, 
Austria, Canada, Germany and Sweden. See Schönmann et al. (2000)  for an overview. 
16 The costs and gains of a wage increase are given by )(']~)([ WNVWV −  and NWV )(' , respectively, both 
expressions depending on b . The decline in costs is due to the fact that V declines by more than V~  which is due 
to different discount factors (the probability for getting unemployment benefits bW  is higher for an employed 
person than for a person who is unemployed in the bargaining period and must be reemployed before benefits 
bW  are obtained in the following unemployment spells). The decline in the gains of a wage increase is due to 
the fact that future benefits, which depend on current wages, are rising less if b is lower. 
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where )](/[)()( 22 ruruug ++≡ δδδ  . Since 0)(' <ug  it follows that the right-hand side of 
eq. (26) declines with increases in u . Due to the assumption that 1>µ  it is easy to show that 
uu
ugb
=
<− )()1(µ . Hence, for uu →  the wage-setting curve has a negative slope, i.e. 
0/)( <duudW . Since for uu →  the expression ]1)([ −uµω approaches zero, it follows from 
eq. (25) that for uu →  the slope of the wage-setting curve approaches ∞− . 
 
For 1=u  one obtains δδ /)()1( rg += . Thus, two cases must be distinguished. If 
δδµ /)()1( rb +≤−  the wage-setting curve does not have a positive slope at 1=u . Together 
with 0)(' <
=uu
ug  it can be concluded that the wage-setting curve falls over the whole range 
]1,(u . However, if δδµ /)()1( rb +>−  the wage-setting curve has a positive slope at 1=u . 
In this case there exists a negatively and positively sloped bough of the wage-setting curve.  
To obtain some intuition for the slope of the wage-setting curve consider first a situation with 
low unemployment. An increase in the unemployment rate then implies worse outside 
opportunities at the firm level (at given wages 1W ), thereby reducing wage pressure. In the 
general equilibrium this effect is reinforced by the fact that wages 1W  in all firms decline and 
that future unemployment benefits, which are linked to wages, will be lower. However, the 
unemployment rate may eventually reach a critical level at which unions drive up their wage 
demands again if the unemployment rate increases. Intuitively this can be explained in the 
following way: On the one hand, a higher unemployment rate increases the weight of current 
unemployment benefits 
0t
B  (in the consideration of unions), and also increases the weight of 
future benefits bW of those who remain at work in the bargaining period. On the other hand, 
future unemployment benefits decline if real wages determined by the bargaining parties go 
down. If real wages are low and the unemployment rate is high enough, the welfare loss of an 
additional unemployed member may become lower than the welfare gain of higher wages for 
those who remain at work (remember that 
0t
B  is exogenously given). In this case wage 
demands of unions increase. Since all unions behave identical, average wages go up 
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improving the outside opportunities of workers. This gives rise to higher wage demands 
again. As a result, the aggregate wage-setting curve may have a positively sloped bough.  
5 Comparison with other unemployment compensation schemes 
5.1 Earnings-related benefits as a function of the actual average wage level  
It is useful to contrast the wage-setting curve implied by eq. (24) with the wage-setting curve 
which results under the usual assumptions (ii) and (iii) of the literature. These assumptions 
correspond to an unemployment compensation scheme in which benefits of all unemployed 
are always related to the actual average wage level. In this case unemployment benefits are 
the same across individuals and time periods, i.e. 10 bWbWBt ==  in the above equations. Eq. 
(22) can then be simplified to  
 [ ] 11 )()(1 bWuWuU ωω +−≡ , (22a) 
with )(uω being defined in eq. (18).17 Hence, U does not depend on individual wages and 
does not include an exogenous benefit component
0t
B . Using eq. (22a) instead of eq. (22) in 
the above analysis would lead to the following aggregate wage-setting equation:  
 )()1(1 ub ωµ −= . (24a) 
This equation has completely different implications compared to the one derived in eq. (24). 
Since in eq. (24a) only the unemployment rate shows up as endogenous variable, the wage-
setting curve is vertical. This implies that the wage-setting equation alone already determines 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment *u , with  
 
rbr
u
−−+
=
µδ
δ
)1)((
* . (27) 
                                                 
17 Eq. (22a) results, for instance, in the model of Layard and Nickell (1990), p.781. 
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 A permissible solution requires that ]1,0[* ∈u  and therefore 1)1( ≥− µb .18 Due to eq. (27) a 
reduction in b  leads to lower equilibrium unemployment. The reason is that in this model 
variant a lower b not only reduces future unemployment benefits but also benefits of the 
currently unemployed.  
A vertical wage-setting curve has often been used in the literature since it is in line with the 
stylized fact that labor demand shifts caused by technological change have no (long-run) 
impact on the level of unemployment, see Layard et al. (1991). To obtain a vertical curve not 
only must be assumed that workers have isoelastic utility functions and that production is of 
the Cobb-Douglas type, but, in addition, it is also necessary to restrict the analysis to a model 
variant with a special institutional setup of the unemployment compensation system.  
5.2 Earnings-related benefits as a function of the average wage level which 
prevailed when getting unemployed 
The crucial assumption for a vertical wage-setting curve is assumption (iii) which requires 
that unemployment benefits are the same for persons being already unemployed in the 
bargaining period and persons getting unemployed in later time periods. The importance of 
this assumption can be seen by analyzing a model variant where this assumption is not made, 
but assumption (ii) is maintained. This amounts to an unemployment compensation scheme in 
which unemployment benefits are related to the average wage level which prevailed during 
the last employment spell of the respective person. In this case in eq. (22) the term )(bW must 
be replaced by )( 1bW , whereas  0tB  denotes benefits which are related to the previous 
average wage level (prevalent before the wage bargain took place), i.e. 
 11 )]()([)()](1[ 0 bWuuBuWuU t λψτω −++−≡ . (22b) 
In this case the aggregate wage-setting equation can be written as 
                                                 
18 With 0>δ  the result 0* =u  is not possible. It will be later shown that at 1* =u  no equilibrium exists since 
for 1→u  the slope of the aggregate labor demand curve approaches infinity. The condition 1)1( >− µb  
guarantees that 1*0 << u ( 0* >u  is satisfied if  )/()1( δµ +>− rrb ). 
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0)(])(1[)]1))(()(()([
)()(~ tBbububuuu
uuWW λλλψτµ
µτ
++−−−+
== . 
Taking account of the explanations in Appendix A.1, the wage-setting equation can be 
transformed to:  
 
0)(]1)(][)(1[
)()(~ tBbuubu
uuWW λµωλ
µτ
+−+
== . (24b) 
For 0)(~ >uW  the denominator of eq. (24b) must be positive. For this to hold it is sufficient 
that uu > , since in this case 01)( >−uµω . 19  From a comparison of eqs. (24) and (24b) in 
the interval ]1,(u  it follows that wage pressure is ceteris paribus higher if unemployment 
benefits are a function of individual wages instead of the average wage level. Since the 
denominator in eq. (24) is smaller, for all permissible values of u  the respective wage-setting 
curve lies strictly above the wage-setting curve implied by eq. (24b). The intuition for this 
result is that unions take into account that higher wages today mean higher benefits for its 
members tomorrow if unemployment benefits depend on individual wages. This leads to 
higher wage pressure. Similar to eq. (24) it also follows from eq. (24b) that a reduction in the 
future replacement ratio b  at current benefit levels 
0t
B  increases wage pressure. It can 
therefore be concluded that for this surprising result to hold it is not necessary that 
unemployment benefits depend on individual wage levels. 
Differentiating )(~ uW  with respect to u  leads to  
 
02)](~[
)('~)()(~)(')(~
tBuq
uquuqu
du
uWd µτµτ −
= , (25b) 
                                                 
19 Although the wage-setting equation in eq. (24b) is also valid for unemployment rates lower than u  we only 
consider the interval ]1,(u , in which a comparison with the other wage-setting curves is possible. 
  
 
 
18
where buubuuq )(]1)(][)(1[)(~ λµωλ +−+≡ . Performing the same analysis as described in 
Appendix A.2 and using )(')()()(' uuuu τλτλ = , it can be seen that the same condition for the 
slope of the wage-setting curve as in eq. (26) is obtained, i.e.  
 
du
Wd ~
<
=
> 0  iff )1( b−µ
<
=
> )(ug , (26b) 
where the function )(ug  is defined after eq. (26). As a result, in the interval ]1,(u  the slope of 
the wage-setting curve )(~ uW  has the same sign as the slope of the wage-setting curve )(uW  
determined by eq. (24). 
5.3 Intertemporally constant flat-rate unemployment benefits 
For some countries a flat-rate unemployment compensation scheme, where all unemployed 
earn a constant payment B , is typical. Substituting B  for bW , 1bW and 0tB  in eq. (22) leads 
to  
 BuWuU )()](1[ 1 ωω +−≡ . (22c) 
In this case the following aggregate wage-setting equation is obtained 
 B
u
uuWW
1)(
)()(
−
==
µω
µω . (24c) 
 For 0)( >uW  it is required that 01)( >−uµω . Hence, the corresponding wage-setting curve 
is defined for the same interval ]1,(u  as the wage-setting curve in eq. (24). The wage-setting 
curve implied by eq. (24c) falls over the whole range ]1,(uu∈  since unemployment benefits 
do not depend on real wages determined in the bargaining process. If it is assumed that 
0t
BB = , it can be derived that the wage-setting curve defined by eq. (24c) lies strictly below 
)(uW defined by eq. (24).20  The reason is that rising wages do not lead to higher 
unemployment benefits, which cet. par leads to lower wage pressure. 
                                                 
20 This can be seen by taking into account that )()()()( uuuu λωωτ =− . 
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5.4 Intertemporally varying flat-rate unemployment benefits  
As a final step, we consider the implications of a flat-rate unemployment compensation 
scheme with different benefit levels for those persons who entered unemployment before or in 
the bargaining period )~(B  and persons getting unemployed in later periods )(B . Substituting 
B~  for 
0t
B  and B  for 1bW  and bW  in eq. (22)  leads to  
 )~)(()()](1[ 1 BBuBuWuU −−+−= τωω , (22d) 
where it has been taken into account )()()()( uuuu τωλψ −=− . The aggregate wage-setting 
curve is then given  
 






−−
−
== )~(
)(
)(
1)(
)()( BB
u
uB
u
uuWW
ω
τ
µω
µω . (24d) 
Note that for BB =~  eq. (24c)  is obtained. It can be shown that BB ~≥  is sufficient for a 
negatively sloped wage-setting curve in the interval ]1,(u , while )( uW  may exhibit a 
positively sloped bough if BB ~< .21 With respect to the impact of unemployment benefits 
B and B~  the following results are obtained: A reduction of flat-rate benefits B~  for those 
persons who are unemployed in the bargaining period reduces wage pressure and therefore 
unemployment. However, a reduction of flat-rate benefits B  for those persons who become 
unemployed after the bargaining period has the opposite effects. This result can be derived 
from eq. (24d) by noting that 1)(/)( >uu ωτ  for 0>u  (and hence for uu > ). Together with 
the results in Section 4 and Subsection 5.2 it can be concluded that the perverse impact on 
wage pressure caused by a change in unemployment benefit levels for the future unemployed 
does not depend on whether benefits are earnings-related or paid as flat-rate transfers. 
                                                 
21 The derivation of these results is available from the authors upon request. 
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6 The general equilibrium 
In this section we consider the general equilibrium which results with the wage-setting curve 
derived in eq. (24). For the general equilibrium also the aggregate labor demand curve must 
be taken into account. With isoelastic goods demand, Cobb-Douglas technology and the 
assumption of a symmetric equilibrium the equation for aggregate labor demand is 
 
α
ακ
−






−
==
1
)1(
/)(
u
LKuHW , (28) 
where K  and L  denote the total stock of capital and the labor supply. It is evident that the 
aggregate labor demand curve has a positive slope in real wage-unemployment space, with 
∞=
→
)('lim
1
uH
u
. Since the wage-setting curve of eq. (24) has a finite value at  
1
)(
=u
uW  and 
since −∞=→ )('lim uWuu it follows that an equilibrium exists. If )(uW  is falling over the 
whole range ]1,(u , the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. If the wage-setting curve has 
a positive bough over some part of the interval, multiple equilibria may exist from a 
theoretical point of view (depending on the parameter constellation). However, if in 
simulation experiments plausible ranges for the various parameters are chosen, it turns out 
that a unique equilibrium is obtained.  
[Figure 3] 
 
Consider as an example Figure 3(a) where two wage-setting curves with different replacement 
ratios b   are plotted.22  As can be seen from Figure 3(a) both wage-setting curves have a 
positive bough. The positively sloped parts of the two wage-setting curves seem to be relevant 
only for (unrealistically) high levels of the unemployment rate. However, it can be shown that 
                                                 
22 For this figure we chose 9.0=κ , a labor income share 7.0=ακ , 06.0=r , 25.0=γ ,  4.0
0
=tB  and 
07.0=δ . To obtain consistent values for LK /  in the aggregate labor demand equation we used the 
relationship ακα −−−= ))~1/()/(()1( uLKr , and set 06.0~ =u . 
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for a sufficiently low level of the bargaining power of labor unions, γ , both wage-setting 
curves have a minimum at an unemployment rate lower than 1.0=u . This implies that the 
positively sloped bough of )(uW  becomes relevant if union power declines, a trend that has 
often been emphasized in the empirical literature on trade union membership, see Calmfors et 
al. (2001). 
In Figure 3(a) the wage-setting curve with the replacement ratio 3.0=b  lies above  the wage-
setting curve with the higher replacement ratio 6.0=b . In Figure 3(b) the aggregate labor 
demand curve is depicted. It can be seen that the slope of this curve is getting very steep with 
high unemployment rates and for 1→u  approaches infinity. Figure 3(c) shows only a small 
range for the unemployment rate where wage-setting curve and aggregate labor demand curve 
intersect in the general equilibrium. Since to the right of the intersection point the aggregate 
labor demand curve lies above the wage-setting curve and since with higher unemployment 
rates the slope of the labor demand curve increases more than the slope of the wage-setting 
curve (along the positive bough), a unique equilibrium is obtained. Figure 3(c) confirms the 
analytical result that a lower replacement ratio for future unemployment benefits leads to 
higher  wage pressure and hence higher  unemployment. However, a significant reduction in 
b  from 0.6 to 0.3 has a rather small effect on the unemployment rate which increases from 
9.67 to 9.9 percent. 
7 Taxes on wage income and unemployment benefits 
So far we have assumed that unemployment benefits are financed by lump-sum taxes on the 
fixed stock of capital. This assumption seems to be at odds with the large tax burden on labor 
income in real-world tax systems. In many countries unemployment benefits also are subject 
to income taxation. Moreover, in most countries with earnings-related benefits, 
unemployment compensation is related to gross income, see OECD (1999). To account for 
the role of labor income taxation, we define WsW W
n )1( −≡  and  11 )1( WsW W
n
−≡  as net 
wages and bsb b
n )1( −≡  as the replacement ratio relevant for those who entered 
unemployment after the bargaining period 0t . The parameter Ws  and bs  denote the tax rates 
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on wage income and unemployment benefits, respectively. Moreover,  
00
)1( tb
n
t BsB −≡  
denotes the level of unemployment benefits for those persons who entered unemployment 
before or in the bargaining period. By replacing W , 1W , b  and 0tB  by their respective net 
values in eqs. (11)-(15) and again assuming risk-neutral workers, the following Nash product 
is maximized: 
 [ ]{ } { } γγ −−⋅−⋅=Ω 1)()()(
0
WNNRUUNt , s.t. 0=−WRN , where (29) 
 WbuWbuBuWuWUU nnnt
nn )()()()](1[)()( 11 0 λψτω +−−−−≡⋅−⋅ . (30) 
Following the steps of the analysis in Section 3, instead of eq. (24) the following equation is 
obtained: 
 [ ][ ]
s
t
s
s B
ubu
uuWW
0
1)()(1
)()(
−+
==
µωλ
µτ , (31) 
where )1/()1( wb
s ssbb −−≡ and )1/()1(
00 wbt
s
t ssBB −−≡ . Two cases can be distinguished: 
First, if tax rates on wages and unemployment benefits are equal, i.e. if bW ss = , eqs. (24) and 
(31) coincide, implying that taxes have no impact on gross wages. In this case the analysis of 
Sections 4-6, which then determines gross wages, remains unchanged. Net wages can be 
computed by WsW W
n )1( −≡ , where Ws  is determined by the government budget constraint. 
Second, it is often the case that the government imposes a lower tax burden on unemployment 
benefits. Consider as an example a situation where φ)1()1( Wb ss −=− , with 1>φ . This 
implies that the net income share of unemployed workers is higher than the net income share 
of employees, i.e. WWBBbWWb nt
n
t
n //)/()(
00
>= . In this case, φbbs =  and φ
00 t
s
t BB =  in 
eq. (31). This leads to 
 
[ ][ ]
φ
µωφλ
µτφ
0
1)()(1
)()( tB
ubu
uuWW
−+
== . (32) 
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Thus, our results of Sections 4 - 6 remain valid with the only difference that b  and 
0t
B have to 
be substituted by φb  and φ
0t
B , respectively.  
8 Further discussion 
In line with the literature on dynamic wage bargaining it has been assumed that wage bargains 
take place at the firm level. There is a large number of small bargaining units which implies 
that (1) they neglect the impact of their decisions on the aggregate economy and (2) they do 
not behave strategically. However, in many economies wage bargains take place at the 
industry or national level. From the work of Clamfors and Driffill (1988) and others it is well-
known that this may affect the position and perhaps also the shape of the wage-setting curve, 
leading to a hump-shaped relationship between unemployment and the degree of 
centralization of wage bargains in the general equilibrium.23 
A detailed discussion of the impact of the degree of centralization on the wage-setting curve 
is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can analyze how the labor union's 
objective function has to be changed. Consider an economy where wage bargains take place 
between a central labor union and firms. In this case property (1) of our model is violated 
since the central labor union internalizes the externalities arising from the wage bargain.24 The 
wage bargain between the central labor union and firms determines the wage level for the 
whole economy. This implies that in Figure 1 1W  has to be replaced by W . Moreover, there is 
no difference between V and 1V  as well as between V  and 1V . Instead of equation (16) one 
obtains  
 { })()()()]()([)()(1~
0t
BUubWUuuWUu
r
VV τωτωδ −−++=− . (33) 
                                                 
23 As argued by Danthine and Hunt (1994) and Flanagan (1999), the hump-shaped relationship may become 
rather flat in an open economy, implying that differences in bargaining structure are of less importance in open 
economies. 
24 See Calmfors (1993) for an enumeration of various external effects caused by the wage bargain. 
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The central union internalizes the impact of higher wage demands on the unemployment rate, 
implying that u  is no longer considered to be exogenous in the wage bargain.  
In the case of wage bargains at the industry level additionally property (2) is violated since 
bargaining units can be expected to behave strategically. In some countries, as for instance in 
Germany, one industry often has a leadership position affecting the bargaining outcome in 
other industries. If this is taken into account in the wage bargain of the leading industry, the 
external effects of wage bargaining are internalized similar to the case of a central labor 
union.  
The results in this paper have been derived for a closed economy. In an open economy the 
wage bargaining process also affects the real exchange rate which is often associated with the 
competitiveness of an economy, see for instance Layard et al. (1991), chapter 8.4. This is 
taken into account in Beissinger and Büsse (2001) who analyze the wage bargaining 
outcomes within a two-country-model for different unemployment benefit systems and Cobb-
Douglas technology. They show that changes in the benefit level in one country also affect the 
wage bargaining outcome in the other country. However, the wage-setting curve of each 
country exhibits the same shape as in the closed economy. Hence, it can be expected that our 
analysis is not invalidated in an open economy. 
9 Summary and conclusions 
We show how the analysis in a dynamic wage bargaining model has to be modified if in 
contrast to the literature it is assumed that firstly unemployment benefits are tied to the 
previous level of individually earned wages and secondly unemployment benefits of those 
already unemployed at the beginning of the bargaining period differ from benefits of those 
who get unemployed in later periods. For this aim we develop a dynamic wage bargaining 
framework which encompasses conventional models of the literature as special cases. 
Focusing on a model with Cobb-Douglas production technology and risk-neutral workers, we 
demonstrate that in our model the result of a vertical wage-setting curve is not  obtained. It is 
shown that a crucial prerequisite for a vertical wage-setting curve in an earnings-related 
benefit system is the assumption that unemployment compensation does not depend on the 
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time period in which a worker becomes unemployed. If this assumption is abandoned, the 
wage-setting curve exhibits one of the following shapes depending on the parameter values: 
either the curve has a negative slope over the whole range of (permissible) unemployment 
rates or the curve exhibits a negative slope for low unemployment rates and has a positive 
slope for high ones. As a further result it follows from our analysis that wage claims are cet. 
par.  higher if unemployment benefits are a function of individual wages instead of the 
average wage level. The reason is that labor unions take into account that higher wages today 
imply higher benefits for its members tomorrow which leads to higher wage pressure. 
We also examine how the wage-setting curve is affected by a variation in the parameters. For 
instance, we consider the consequences of labor market reforms which reduce unemployment 
benefits of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period, but keep the benefits of the 
currently unemployed unchanged. We show that such a policy leads to higher wage pressure 
and thus increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This result holds for both earning-
related and flat-rate benefit systems. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Derivation of the aggregate wage-setting curve 
With WW =1  it follows from eq. (23) that 
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The denominator of this equation can be written as 
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Due to the definitions in eq. (18) it holds that 
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uu
uu
ωλ
λψ . (A.3) 
If this is taken into account in eq. (A.2), the aggregate wage-setting curve can be written as 
in eq. (24). 
 
A.2 The slope of the aggregate wage-setting curve 
Since ]1)(][)(1[)( −+≡ ubuuq µωλ , eq. (25) can be rewritten as: 
 ]1)()][(1)[('{)( 2 −+= − uubuuq
du
dW µωλτµ . 
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The derivatives 'τ , 'λ  and 'ω  are: 
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Eq. (A.5) can be simplified by noting that 
 3
2
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+−
+
== δ
δλτλτ , (A.7) 
which leads to 
 
0
))](1)((')()1)()(('[)( 2 tBubuuuuuqdu
dW λωµτµωτµ +−−= − . (A.8) 
The sign of dudW /  depends on the sign of the expression in brackets. Taking the definition 
of the parameters in eq. (18) and the derivatives in eq. (A.6) into account it follows that 
 ))(1)((')()1)()((' ubuuuu λωµτµωτ +−−  
 22
2222
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))(())(1(
δδ
δδδδδµ
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++−+−
=
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The sign of dudW /  depends on the sign of the numerator of this expression, which leads 
to condition (26). 
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Figure 1: Lifetime utility V in the case of an infinite wage bargain and unemployment
benefits being tied to the previous level of individually earned wages 
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Figure 2: Lifetime utility V in the case of an infinite wage bargain and unemployment
benefits being tied to the actual average wage level 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
(a) Wage-setting curves with
different replacement ratio 
(b) Aggregate labor demand curve 
(c) General equilibrium 
Figure 3: The consequences of a decrease in the replacement ratio 
